

INTEGRATION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND STATE DEPARTMENT  
EFFORTS TO CONTINUE THE GLOBAL PURSUIT OF VIOLENT EXTREMIST  
ORGANIZATIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

INTEGRATION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND STATE DEPARTMENT EFFORTS TO CONTINUE THE GLOBAL PURSUIT OF VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS, by Sean P. Lucas, 78 pages.

The United States has been engaged in active conflict against Violent Extremist Organizations for over 11 years. This has given the U.S. the ability to effectively track and target hostile organizations before they could materialize enough manpower and resources to effectively target the U.S. homeland and significant interests abroad. As the U.S. draws down a majority of combat forces from the Middle East, the ability to effectively track organizations that are attempting to target American citizens must be maintained and expanded. The Department of Defense and State Department need to integrate their efforts and maximize their capabilities to maintain the pressure that has been maintained over the past eleven years. The Department of Defense should provide personnel and equipment to help track Violent Extremist Organizations, under the guidance and direction of the State Department, at embassies worldwide to ensure the U.S. maintains awareness of movements and actions of our adversaries. The State Department should conduct diplomatic negotiations, before the need for action arises, to ensure that the U.S. military can conduct rapid actions as needed once a threat is identified.

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## ACRONYMS

AFRICOM	African Command
BBC	British Broadcasting Company
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
COCOM	Combatant Commander
COM	Chief of Mission
CT	Counter Terrorism
DA	Direct Action
DA	Department of the Army
DATT	Defense Attaché
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FM	Field Manual
GEOINT	Geospatial Intelligence
GRF	Global Response Force
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IMINT	Image Intelligence
JP	Joint Publication
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
NSA	National Security Agency
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom



RSO	Regional Security Office
SF	Special Forces
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SR	Special Reconnaissance
TECHINT	Technical Intelligence
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USEUCOM	European Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps
UW	Unconventional Warfare
VEO	Violent Extremist Organizations

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Al Qaeda and its allies must not be permitted to gain or retain any capacity to plan and launch international terrorist attacks, especially against the U.S. homeland. Al Qaeda's core in Pakistan remains the most dangerous component of the larger network, but we also face a growing threat from the group's allies worldwide. We must deny these groups the ability to conduct operational plotting from any locale, or to recruit, train, and position operatives, including those from Europe and North America.

—President Barack Obama, *2010 National Security Strategy*

The U.S. Military has been at war for over 10 years, pursuing large scale combat operations against nations and non-state actors in order to ensure the safety and security of American citizens and other national interests. The wars have come at a tremendous cost and the nation is less inclined to pursue future large scale operations, commit troops to countries that may or may not have an immediate effect on the safety or well-being of Americans and does not have the financial desires to continue sustained deployments. Are there ways to expand our ability to defeat our enemies without engaging in major combat operations or deploying large numbers of troops?

Violent extremist organizations (VEO) are not easily defeated as they do not typically align with a specific nation and do not adhere to international boundaries. They move around, finding ungoverned space to train and organize forces, plan operations, and recruit additional manpower and support. They move in, through and around multiple countries; causing instability and chaos. They cannot be defeated through conventional means, yet pose a huge threat to the security of the US and our allies around the globe. How can we ensure that the State Department is provided with the most relevant and updated information on the movement of these organizations so they can use their global

relationships to gain rapid approval, through diplomatic means, to strike VEOs with U.S. Military Forces?

The State Department has embassies or consulates in most countries around the world. They are responsible for the executive interaction with the host nation and are the face of the United States in that country. What is the process they currently use to facilitate the introduction of US forces to conduct conflict prevention or allow the strike of known enemy targets within their sovereign borders? Can that process be streamlined to allow for time sensitive targeting of VEOs?

In order to effectively protect American people and national interests, deny enemy safe havens and conduct direct action to destroy known VEOs, the U.S. military must be able to respond in a rapid manner, through immediate diplomatic approval while maintaining a clear understanding of what they must accomplish. They must be trained, equipped and capable of conducting these types of operations. What degree and type of coordination must they have with the State Department to be able to accomplish the end state in accordance with U.S. and host nation objectives?

Success will be hard to define while attempting to determine when the U.S. should get involved. The State Department has a much better understanding about the political situation within a country than the DoD can ever have, and it needs to take the lead on the introduction of U.S. military forces. With greater understanding about the political environment, coordination with the State Department and coordination with host nation agencies, the total picture may become clearer on movement of VEOs and the conditions that warrant U.S. military action.

The scope of this research will focus on how the DoD and State Department can work together better to understand conditions that warrant introduction of U.S. military forces. The description of a more aggressive posture to take in order to help prevent regional conflict while destroying VEOs will be researched to allow DoD and State Department personnel to pursue the war on terror. With the war in Afghanistan drawing down and all forces home from supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom, there is an opportunity to increase the tempo of operations against our enemies; simultaneously protecting American people at home and abroad. The lead for planning and coordination must be the State Department while the DoD provides the forces and conducts the operations.

If the United States wants to continue to pursue a global security policy, decrease the overall deployed footprint, reduce the nation's financial burden associated with large scale conflict while preventing further regional conflict, it is the thesis of this paper that there must be a more integrated and comprehensive plan to allow DoD forces into other countries to attack and defeat VEOs.

#### Primary Research Question

How can the DoD and State Department more fully integrate and cooperate to continue to prosecute the war on terrorism against VEO targets that threaten American people and interests once the United States is no longer engaged in active conflict?

### Secondary Research Questions

1. What is the current cooperation and integration between the DoD and State Department to conduct tracking of Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) and what is the Host Nation involvement and cooperation?
2. How is the State Department currently organized to target VEOs?
3. What diplomatic procedures are needed to coordinate targeting of VEOs?
4. Are there arrangements that allow for the rapid engagement of VEO targets?
5. Does the DoD possess the capability to rapidly prosecute targets if needed?
6. What capacity can the DoD provide to support the State Department?

### Significance of the Study

The U.S. and our allies will continue to be the target of extremist organizations based on ideological, economic and political differences. These differences are not going to change and the U.S. must not take a step back on our ability to track, target and defeat them before they are able to inflict harm upon Americans. VEOs have the goal to instill fear and panic in their enemy (the U.S.), through intimidation, attack and violence. This fear and panic can and will disrupt the lives and well being of innocent people while the attacks themselves can be catastrophic.

The best way for the military to continue defeating these threats abroad is to find VEOs, gain diplomatic access to the areas where they live and attack. This process, appearing simple in concept, can and will be extremely difficult. The ability to find VEOs globally is a daunting task itself with a need for an increased capacity within the established global footprint that the U.S Government already has. The diplomatic processes required to allow access into countries for U.S. military personnel and

equipment can be long and is not always guaranteed. The ability of the DoD to conduct strikes against VEOs globally must be explored and options must be generated to understand if it is even feasible.

The U.S. will not be able to maintain a large footprint of personnel and equipment deployed overseas indefinitely. The war in Iraq has concluded and the War in Afghanistan is beginning to draw down. This decrease in American military capability forward deployed to the areas that have the greatest concentration of VEOs will decrease the collection and strike ability against those VEOs. The U.S. will not be able to maintain the foothold that has been established and will not be able to continue conducting offensive operations against those VEOs with the ease and efficiency that has been routine for the past 10 years.

With the decrease in actual military capability available in global hotspots and the decrease in economic, political and social will to continue expensive operations, the U.S. must be able to find efficient and effective ways to continue targeting and defeating VEOs abroad. This must include coordination of the DoD with other agencies within the government, specifically the State Department. The coordination and cooperation between the DoD's personnel expertise and collection capability with the proactive diplomatic practices of the State Department can lead to the rapid attack and destruction of VEOs by DoD assets if needed to protect American citizens and interests.

### Assumptions

The main assumption made while researching this topic has been that there is not a fully integrated approach by the U.S. Government on continuing to find and target VEOs globally. This assumption was made based on personal observations by the author

and the published organization charts and authorities of a Chief of Mission. This assumption was indirectly validated through research as there was no literature available explaining or outlining coordination of the DoD and State Department as a formal team; however, there was significant literature available that concluded that integration was necessary and the process must be formalized.

Assumptions were made about the capacity of the State Department to take on additional tasks without additional manpower. These assumptions were made due to the published tasks that a country team is expected to accomplish and the manning available to accomplish those tasks. Not only does it seem unlikely that there are additional personnel available within the State Department structure to take on intelligence collection and fusion, the State Department has historically not been a collector of intelligence as a matter of principle and policy. Any person found conducting intelligence activities at an embassy is typically subject to ejection from the host country and declared persona non gratis.

The final major assumption was that the drawdown of U.S. military forces in the Middle East will continue, decreasing the ability to conduct operations against VEOs while the motivation and focus of those VEOs will not change. The need to continue aggressive and responsive targeting against VEOs is only valid if they continue to pose a threat to the security of American people and interests. If they no longer pose a threat, the U.S. will no longer have to dedicate the effort to defeating them.

### Limitations

There is very little literature available on this specific topic. The topic and discussion is an emerging issue and there has been very little direct research or



exploration done on the integration of DoD personnel into a country team for the purpose of tracking VEOs. This has resulted in the need for detailed exploration of secondary research questions while drawing conclusions related to the primary research topic.

The classification of a lot of the literature and sources has also caused some information to be beyond the scope of the research. With regards to military capability to strike targets and the intelligence capability to track and fix VEOs, the information has been almost entirely classified. Accordingly, such information has not been used in this paper. Any policy maker or planner would surely want to look at classified material, but the conclusions and recommendations of this research are valid based on the assumptions made and information available through open source and unclassified systems.

### Delimitations

This research has been done entirely through open source, using unclassified means. The thesis remains unclassified with unlimited distribution.

The other agencies, within the U.S. Government, that have the specific task to collect and analyze intelligence cannot be ignored as they have the capacity and capability to augment DoD intelligence teams and collection capabilities. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is specifically organized to collect and analyze HUMINT while the National Security Agency (NSA) has the capability and assets to collect and analyze SIGINT. These organizations will play a large role in the development of intelligence support teams so their capabilities must be understood in order to maximize their benefit. This thesis will not directly analyze those organizations, as they are external to the DoD and State Department, but it is acknowledged that they have the potential to

be an equal participant on the development of teams that can identify, track and assist in targeting VEOs.

### Chapter Summary

The U.S. has remained at war against violent extremism, in one way or another, since 2001. This war has allowed for the rapid and decisive destruction of many VEOs across the Middle East. As the U.S. draws down the remaining forces from this region, the threat that remaining VEOs pose to U.S. people and interests will not change. The requirement to protect Americans will not change. The need to continue targeting these organizations abroad, ensuring the safety of American at home, will not change. What may change is the political, social and economic will to engage in major combat operations for prolonged periods. The U.S. must find a way to continue this fight, through an integration of all agencies of the U.S. Government, particularly the DoD and State Department.

There is a real need for the increased integration of military capability into country teams to track and fix VEO targets; there is a need for an understanding between the agencies on what can be done to expedite the diplomatic clearance for U.S. military operations and there is a requirement to understand what integration currently exists and where it can be expanded. There is a requirement for the coordination of other agencies from the U.S. Government, specifically the CIA and NSA, but their mission, structure and capability will not be addressed in this thesis. It is understood, though, that they have a significant capability to augment an intelligence team and collect all forms of intelligence in support of State Department and DoD goals.

This interagency coordination is the way forward; a combined approach by each department of the government to continue the attack against the enemies of America abroad, before they can instill fear and bring violence to Americans at home.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a lot of literature available to support this research topic, but there is very little that will allow for direct correlation to the primary research question. There is very little written about the direct integration of DoD personnel into Embassy staffs for the purpose of VEO tracking and targeting. As a result, much of the literature is directly related to answering the secondary questions and proving the framework for finding answers for the primary research question. There are some documents that are classified beyond what is available and acceptable for this research, but those gaps are filled with readings and journals that help find solutions based on common knowledge and current, publish situations.

#### Literature Directly Related to the Research Problem

In looking for literature to answer the primary and secondary research topics and questions, the first place to look was for sources and information relating directly to the questions at hand. These sources provided information directly about the research topic, provided firsthand accounts of aspects of DoD and State Department coordination or provided the necessary information about current structure and procedures.

“Expanding Chief of Mission Authority to Produce Unity of Effort,” a summary of an article published by the Simons Center on Fort Leavenworth directly relates to research that had been completed previously on the empowerment of the Chief of Mission to provide unity of effort and a clear chain of command for actions executed by US Government agencies and activities within their prescribed area of responsibility. It

does not specifically discuss the integration of DoD intelligence collection ability or the diplomatic requirements to support DoD actions, but it does relate specifically to the empowerment of the Chief of Mission to synchronize all of the efforts within his area (Lamb and Marks 2011).

“Empowering Interagency Teams,” an article in *World Politics Review*, is a good review of how interagency teams must be properly supported by all agencies, not just the ones most vested in the problem. It has some examples of how teams have worked well in the past, with complete cooperation by all agencies and it has some areas where friction has been encountered. This relates to the problem being researched as the evidence of interagency rivalries or biases can be seen as well as examples of success that can be drawn from (Locher 2009).

“Military Role in U.S. Embassies Creates Strains,” a newspaper article from the *New York Times*, written in 2006 shows how a DoD presence in an Embassy can cause more friction than the benefit that it brings. Military personnel in Embassies, with an agenda different than the Chief of Mission, will certainly cause strains. Since the problem being researched involves the potential of integrating military personnel into daily activities and processes for a Chief of Mission, an understanding of what has occurred in the past is vital to understand where and how future integration can occur. The article is slightly dated, but it was relevant at the time when more military personnel were augmenting Embassy staffs; a similar response or outcome is possible with future DoD and State Department coordination (Mazzetti 2006).

“A U.S. Embassy at Work,” an essay by the State Department is very helpful in explaining how a modern embassy works, what the specific tasks are that it performs and

how all of the parts are integrated together. Most helpful is the acknowledgement of the tasks that it must accomplish, with very good detail on how they relate to each other and the progression of American diplomacy and goals. This will assist in determining what capacity the State Department currently has, specifically what is available in an Embassy and under the control of the Chief of Mission. As with all tasks, an organization can only accomplish a couple of things very well. This understanding is valuable to see how much more a Chief of Mission can be expected to do as well as understand competing requirements (Department of State 2009a).

“Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for national security integration,” is a paper published by the Institute for National Strategic Studies that provides a basis and argument for empowerment of Mission Managers (read as Chief of Mission) to have greater authority and influence over matters that have an effect on national security. The argument is that the president must delegate the authority to the Chiefs of Mission, with Congress approving resources and manpower, so that concerns of national security are resolved more rapidly and effectively. The paper also indicates that the only real obstacle in accomplishing this is political, not legal or resources. This provides great insight into the issue at hand, regarding more effective integration between the DoD and State Department, under the control of the Chief of Mission to continue to track and target VEOs globally (Lamb and Marks 2010).

*RS401-Introduction to Department of State Agency Culture*, this is a class taught at the State Department to new employees. The description of the country team is most relevant as it outlines exactly what each task is, who mans the positions and defines a clear chain of command. The rest of the class is good for describing the culture of the

State Department and how they operate in the field and at home (Department of State 2010).

*Fiscal Year 2011 Agency Financial Report*, this report by the U.S. State Department outlines the financial goals and budget for the department but more relevantly it discusses how much money will be allocated to each of its priorities. It clearly identifies what is most important to the department, how much emphasis it is putting on each program and it provides the baseline for the mission that Secretary Clinton has established. It helped synthesize the strategic information and guidance as well as the focus area for the State Department (Department of State 2011).

“Winning the War Against Al Qaeda in Africa,” an article in the *Wall Street Journal*, has great description about the war on terrorism and how it has expanded into the Horn of Africa. There is good detail on counter-terrorism operations and also a description of the diplomatic reservations going into them and the process that has been used to gain access to the areas. There is a specific reference to Somalia and how there is not a functional government or established diplomatic relations due to the turmoil. The benefit of this article is the demonstration of the commitment to areas outside of declared areas of conflict (Jacobson, Nisman, and Radzinski 2012).

“The Secret War: How U.S. hunted AQ in Africa,” an article published in the *Navy Times* in 2011 demonstrates the initial stages of the war against Al Qaeda in Africa. This shows how there are often disagreements between military and diplomatic priorities and missions and how there needs to be close cooperation to be successful in the long term. The article adds a lot of artificial flair to the ideas, but it does demonstrate initial

missions in an area that had not been previously operated in by U.S. military forces (Naylor 2011).

*Al Qaeda in the Horn of Africa*, a report on the status of Al Shabaab on the HOA and how their influence has expended throughout Somalia and into neighboring nations. The article addresses some of the challenges with conducting focused operations against the terrorist network and how the U.S. has conducted direct action and partnered operations with militaries from the African Union to displace but not defeat the cells. It highlights some of the areas where U.S. diplomacy must be proactive to help gain diplomatic clearance and approvals for future military action if Al Shabaab is able to going footholds in other areas in the region, with their known ties and loyalties to Al Qaeda (Quigley 2011).

Field Manual (FM) 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces*, provides all of the facts on capability and missions for various U.S. Army SOF elements. This FM will be very useful in determining the ability of SOF teams to deploy globally with little or no notice and what they common core competencies are. It provides good detail on both SF and Ranger units and what their strengths and weaknesses are. With this information, their applicability to targeting VEOs is easier to study and understand while seeing what ability the U.S. maintains for rapid response targeting (Department of the Army 2010b).

JP 3-05: *Special Operations*, similar to FM 3-05, the joint publication provides the information needed to understand Navy SOF elements and what they can provide to the Chief of Mission or COCOM. Understanding what each team brings in respect to capability and competence is critical in understanding what options are available to conduct strikes against VEOs and their safe havens (Joint Forces Command 2011a).



MCDP 3: *USMC Expeditionary Operations*, a detailed description of what capability the USMC has to conduct global operations. The publication comes directly from the Commandant and provides specific guidance and shared understanding of what each type of Marine Air-Ground task Force is capable of. Specifically for this research, the MEU is relevant as the force that is continuously deployed and available for employment globally (Department of the Navy 1998).

*Special Operations Forces Reference Manual*, a manual published by the Joint Special Operations University, providing very detailed capabilities of each SOF element and what they can accomplish in support of VEO targeting. This is a consolidated view of all options, with research revealing which specific force can provide the best effect and is most available to the commander or Chief of Mission for employment (Joint Special Operations University 2011).

Field Manual (FM) 2-0, *Intelligence*; the Army manual on intelligence collection, assets and capabilities. This FM provided information on the different types on intelligence disciplines within the Army so they could be studied and related to providing support to a Chief of Mission. The descriptions are very detailed as each job, title and organization is explored and understood (Department of the Army 2010a).

*The National Security Strategy*, published by the United States outlines President Obama's priorities and plan for the maintenance of security for American citizens at home and abroad. This document, provided specifically as strategic level guidance to all agencies within the government, provides the details about what the President wants to accomplish. It clearly identifies the defeat of terrorism and security of Americans as a high priority. This directly relates to the research question as it provides definitive

Executive level guidance on the defeat of VEOs. This is interpreted, for this research, as guidance on interagency cooperation and integrated efforts to accomplish the President's directives and objectives (Obama 2010).

#### Literature Indirectly Related to the Research Problem

Once adequate literature was found to help answer the research questions directly, the next area to explore was indirect sources to help provide answers to the questions in an indirect way. These sources help to provide answers through some interpretation and by drawing conclusions based on information provided.

*Posture Statement of U.S. Africa Command*, briefed by General Ham, the US AFRICOM Commander explained his desires and goals for AFRICOM. He discussed how he wanted to go forward and integrate all of the agencies of the US Government. His focus was largely on the economic development of African nations while drawing parallels to the integration of the State Department, Intelligence communities and the DoD. This was helpful in setting the stage, at the Operational/Strategic level, for analysis and understanding of guidance that a Combatant Commander has for his organization (Ham 2012).

*Failed States Index*, analysis done by the Foreign Policy Institute and depicted geographically with each nation on the globe in a different color was very descriptive on where trouble spots are potentially going to arise and what nations will have the most trouble as they move forward. It was most helpful in understanding what regions of the world have the most potential for VEO activity, sanctuary and operations. Though not tied directly to policy or practice, it does link into General Ham's Posture Statement of U.S. Africa Command (Foreign Policy 2012).

“U.S. Seeks Global Spec Ops Network,” an article from Defense News, clearly outlines the US SOCOMs desire to expand Special Operations Forces (SOF) activities and influence globally. It references both General Mulholland and Admiral McRaven and their desire to expand to regions in Africa and Asia with training, partnership and influence activities. Increased partnership and training will allow SOCOM to understand and defeat future enemies and their capabilities. Understanding future enemies relates directly to the problem at hand, with the requirement to determine their motives and objectives, as well as to coordinate with the State Department for diplomatic approval in a timely manner to conduct a military operation to accomplish the US objectives (Opall-Rome 2012).

“The U.S. Response to Precarious States: Tentative Progress and Remaining Obstacles to Coherence,” an article from the Center for Global Development, loosely relates to the topic with a brief description of progress that the US has made with developing nations and how to continue moving forward (Stewart 2007).

*President Barack Obama’s Letter to Ambassadors/Chiefs of Mission*; President Obama gave his guidance to each of the Chiefs of Mission when he took office. Each Chief of Mission is an extension of the Executive Branch of Government so the President gave specific guidelines and expectations for them. The highlight from the letter that is relevant to this research is the emphasis on defeating terrorism, preventing the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the integration of all agencies and partners (Obama 2009).

*The Budget for Fiscal year 2013*. This is the official budget that the White House has published, in draft form, for fiscal year 2013. It is helpful to see how the overseas

contingency funding for the military is being significantly scaled back while it shows a decrease in the number of troops serving overseas. This will help to establish the framework for the drawdown in Afghanistan, as was observed in Iraq in 2011. The drawdown in the Middle East will certainly affect the ability of the U.S. to conduct counter terrorism operations in that region and the need for codified diplomatic process and coordination to allow for continued operations globally (White House 2012).

“Pakistani Army Chief Warns U.S. on Another Raid” is a newspaper article published in the *New York Times* soon after the raid that killed Osama Bin Laden. This specific article helps establish the Pakistani response to the operation, one where there was no diplomatic coordination or knowledge shared with the Pakistani government. As part of the research, it must be understood what international laws and regulations govern military operations in sovereign nations, and the operation that killed Bin Laden is a good case study for that. The international community did not condemn the operation but that can be assumed due to the nature of the targeted individual and the fact that it was successful (Perlez 2011).

“Pakistan Pushes Back Against U.S. Criticism on Bin Laden” another article from the *New York Times* that helps demonstrate the diplomatic pressure that U.S. was applying to Pakistan prior to and after the raid that killed Bin Laden. It indicates the political pressure that was unsuccessful in convincing the Pakistani military or ISI to be more aggressive and forceful with their operations to defeat Al Qaeda (Rohde 2011).

“Bin Laden death: What did Pakistan know?” This commentary by the BBC demonstrates how little the Pakistani Government knew about the operation that killed Osama Bin Laden and the complete lack of diplomatic coordination and relations that

preceded the action. It also briefly goes into the Pakistani response to the action (Ware 2011).

Colombia Assistance Package Fact Sheet, a document initially written in 2000 as a justification and outline for the support that the U.S. was willing to provide to the Colombian government as part of the aid to help curb the narcotics trade and defeat terrorism. This fact sheet, published by the White House was very beneficial in seeing what emphasis was being put on this mission at the executive level and how much focus the President was giving it. The most beneficial part of the document was the reference to the counter terrorism emphasis in the development of the Colombian military (White House 2000).

*Helping Colombia Fix Its Plan to Curb Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Insurgency*, a report published by the Heritage Foundation describes the emphasis on fighting the insurgents in Colombia that are funding and distributing narcotics and how if not addressed it could lead to a greater regional instability. This article helps establish the background on the problem and helps frame a potential solution (Johnson 2001).

*U.S. Relations With Colombia*, a report published by the State Department, specifically the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, that provides a more modern context for the involvement of the U.S. diplomatically and militarily in Colombia. It provides an updated perspective relative to the direction and guidance that was published in 2000 with the Colombia Plan. This document helps to understand how diplomacy can change over time as adversaries and political stability changes (Department of State 2012).

*ALARACT 293/2012*, this guidance was published by the U.S. Army G1 and outlines how the Army will drawdown forces, while decreasing the amount each unit is filled. There is also specific guidance on how each unit will be manned and establishes a priority on fill for personnel. The requirement for a Global Response Force (GRF) is established and designated, with guidance to fill GRF units to a higher capacity than other units. This information is very valid in the establishment of military capability to strike VEO targets globally, if they are identified and the diplomatic clearances are in place (Department of the Army 2012).

Joint Publication (JP) 2-03, *Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*; the JP specifically relates to GEOINT. This manual helps fill in gaps left by FM 2-0 on GEOINT, since that specific discipline has multiple subsets and works with several types of intelligence collection and analysis. This JP helps with the analysis of specific jobs that are filled by military personnel that could be used to support a Chief of Mission (Joint Forces Command 2007).

Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence*; the Army FM directly relating to HUMINT. This document is relevant as it provides more information relating to HUMINT and how it can support a Chief of Mission (Department of the Army 2006).

*National Military Strategy*, published in 2011 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as strategic guidance for the military to accomplish the presidential directives and how the military fits into the National Security Strategy. The CJCS says that the key will be working within the government and with interagency partners to accomplish the strategy. This is the military aspect of desiring to be more integrated with

the interagency in support of the NSS and directly relates to the research of this problem (Mullen 2011).

“Project on National Security Reform: U.S. Counter-Terrorism Operations in Somalia and the Horn of Africa 2001-Present.” This article outlines difficulties between the State Department and DoD in implementing the counter-terrorism plan across the Horn of Africa and provides a possible model that may work for that area.

#### Literature Providing Atmospheric and Overarching Information

In order to understand the bigger picture, information about what is going on around the immediate problem is also important to understand. These sources help understand how the problem fits into the larger context and help frame the problem better.

JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination*, is the joint doctrinal solution to DoD activities with and in support of other governmental agencies and the joint community. There are specific things that the DoD can do and there are procedures in place to allow for the further integration of DoD and other agency activities (Joint Forces Command 2011b).

*Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs*, CJCSI 5715.01B, is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) document that generally outlines what is expected at the Joint Staff level on integration and synthesis with other agencies. It provides a loose guideline for integration but is mostly beneficial in the understanding of the strategic guidance that the CJSC has published and his expectations for further integration (Joint Staff 2008).

*UN Charter, Chapter 2*, this chapter of the United Nations Charter explains the rights of sovereign countries to protect their borders and establishes international law that prevents incursions from other nations while allowing for the government to regulate actions and activities within their borders. This is relevant as it is the basis for the diplomatic requirements prior to any military actions within sovereign nations. The research is focused on the need to have standing diplomatic agreements with sovereign nations to allow for the rapid execution of military options when fleeting or time sensitive VEO targets are identified (United Nations 1945).

*Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Article 2*, this article lays the ground work for diplomatic relations and establishes the requirement for voluntary participation between nations. This voluntary relationship is essential as any violation of common regulations or territory can and will strain relations, with no legal basis for re-establishing them (United Nations 1961a).

*Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Article 4*, this article relates to Article 2 and deals with the Chief of Mission responsibility and requirements. A host nation must approve the Chief of Mission for each nation that it maintains diplomatic relations with (United Nations 1961b).

*International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, this report, also from 2000, again influences the U.S. commitment to the disruption of Narcotics trade and proliferation while simultaneously acknowledging that there is a direct connection between the narcotics trade and terrorism and VEOs (Department of State 2000).

*Multi-Service TTPs for Conventional Forces and SOF Integration and Interoperability*, this TTP manual provides some baseline for how forces will integrate



with each other once a crisis has been identified. It does not relate directly to the research but it provides a good understanding of integrated capability within the DoD to conduct short notice operations (Joint Forces Command 2010).

*United States Institute of Peace Special Report on Integrated Security Assistance, 2008.* This report outlines the difficulty that the DoD and State Department had in regards to integrating efforts into the State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (Perito 2008).

*Project on National Security reform: U.S. Interagency Efforts to Combat International Terrorism through Foreign Capacity Building Programs.* This article addresses some of the ongoing programs supporting other nations before conflict breaks out and some of the difficulties and lack of integration between elements.

### Summary

This pool of literature has provided a great basis for research into the primary and secondary questions but it leaves a lot of gaps that must be filled through analysis and assumptions. This is due largely to the nature of the research topic, the classification of much of the material available and the newer concepts being explored. There is adequate literature available for research but there is very little professional reading currently available that directly addresses the concept of integrating DoD professionals into the staff of a Chief of Mission to continue targeting and tracking VEOs globally. This concept is new and much of the literature will be used to paint the picture, describe the current situation and show where different agencies have the capacity to cooperate and integrate to accomplish a greater objective.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In conducting research, there are two primary techniques that can be used: qualitative and quantitative. These two techniques, though varied in many ways, both help to provide insight, analysis techniques, and reasoning behind a method of research.

Quantitative research involves testing hypotheses, looking at the cause and effect of an action and drawing conclusions based on that effect. It specifically looks at the numbers and statistics surrounding a problem, often times with clear and obvious answers appearing when the proper statistics are collected and analyzed. This type of research involves maintaining an objective outlook on the problem, with conclusions being drawn based on the statistics that are presented (Johnson and Christensen 2008).

Qualitative research does not involve statistics and numbers like quantitative; it is more focused on the understanding and interpretation of social interaction with the study of the entire problem and all factors that play into it, not just specific variables and statistics. This form of research provides for a subjective interpretation by the researcher, with the conclusions based on interpretation of the observations and study conducted (Lichtman 2006).

There are advantages and disadvantages to each of the techniques, with one method helping to find a more definitive answer based on hard numbers and facts and the other technique allowing for a more broad based research with conclusions being drawn based on the interpretation by the researcher. There must be an acknowledgement that using the quantitative method will result in a more objective conclusion, supported by

numbers while the qualitative method will have a subjective aspect that can only be supported by reason and shared understanding.

Based on the subject matter of this thesis, qualitative research will be primarily used since there is very little literature available to answer the primary research question. It is not possible to conduct statistical research and formulate answers or draw conclusions based on numbers; conclusions are drawn based on interpretation of the data collected to answer the secondary research questions.

The method for finding answers to the primary research question is to answer six separate secondary questions, each providing a part of the information required in order to use logic to answer the primary question. These six secondary questions and how they relate to the primary topic are explained in greater detail immediately below.

Question 1: What is the current level of collaboration between the DoD and State Department to conduct tracking of Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) and what is the Host Nation involvement and cooperation? A researcher must first understand the current state of cooperation between the DoD and State Department before areas can be identified for improvement. This understanding will allow for a better basis for starting so conclusions can be made on how to move forward and increase the effective coordination. If there is adequate cooperation at some locations and there is great efficiency with the integration in some areas, the primary question can be answered based on a couple isolated case studies, with conclusions and recommendations being drawn from the experience of those teams that are currently operating effectively.

Question 2: How is the State Department currently organized to target VEOs? It is understood that the State Department is not responsible for the tracking or targeting of

VEOs. They have an inherent responsibility to protect themselves but they do not have the capacity or requirement to conduct intelligence collection or synchronization.

Determining what they are expected to accomplish and the assets / personnel that they have to conduct analysis and gain understanding of their area of responsibility will help to identify existing infrastructure that can be used and augmented by DoD personnel.

Question 3: What diplomatic procedures are needed to coordinate the rapid targeting of VEOs? A major consideration for the conduct of time sensitive targeting by the DoD is the diplomatic coordination and clearance between the State Department and the host nation. This clearance is something that must be discussed and gained before the need arises, not once it becomes critical. Understanding what processes are in place and how much time and effort is currently dedicated to the diplomatic process will help in determining how much more can be expected and what is really possible with preemptive diplomacy.

Question 4: Are there arrangements that allow for the rapid engagement of VEO targets? Knowing what the current diplomatic agreements that are in place will allow for an understanding of how the U.S. can progress forward. By studying existing agreements, specifically with Colombia under “Plan Colombia” and the diplomatic agreements made for the U.S. to conduct operations in the Horn of Africa an understanding of the processes that have been used will be gained. This understanding will help to draw conclusions for processes that can be used in the future. The two examples that will be analyzed have been developing for a long time and were not conducted in a proactive manner. They took years to develop but the agreements themselves are very effective. The product is what will be studied, allowing for conclusions to be drawn about what needs to be

accomplished prior to the need for action. A case study of the raid that killed Osama Bin Laden will also be addressed as an example of an operation that was conducted without prior diplomatic approvals. This will demonstrate the reaction of a sovereign nation and international community if the U.S. military conducts an operation without gaining approval to strike.

Question 5: Does the DoD possess the capability to rapidly prosecute targets if needed? Before recommending changes to DoD and State Department cooperation, the capacity of the DoD to actually conduct rapid operations if a VEO target is identified must be studied. By understanding the capability of the DoD to conduct the operations, the validity of the solution can be realized. If the DoD does not have the ability to conduct these types of operations, there is no need to recommend changes since there will be no ability to act on the intelligence collected. This answer may be in the form of SOF or conventional forces that are assigned to COCOMs around the globe. The ability to strike a target, by any capable force, is what must be understood.

Question 6: What capacity can the DoD provide to support the State Department? The DoD has developed and refined significant intelligence collections and fusion capabilities since 2001. These capabilities will become more available once U.S. forces draw down from the Middle East. Looking at what that capability is and how it has worked in the past will help to understand how it can be applied to support intelligence needed by the State Department.

### Data Collection

There is very little specific literature available on the topic of this thesis so collecting information and thoroughly researching each of the secondary questions will

be the major factor in gaining adequate awareness of the problem and options for drawing conclusions.

Literature will be collected using open source and unclassified means only, allowing for maximum distribution of the research. There are more options available for research using classified means and documents due to the source of intelligence collection, organization of DoD units and the specifics on the diplomatic process and agreements between nations. This will not prevent the general understating of the problem or coming to logical conclusions. It is recommended in chapter 5 to conduct further research on this topic using classified sources and means.

The CARL library has an extensive online and hard copy database for periodicals, literature and professional reading. This provides the professional perspective that other researchers have gained in areas surrounding this topic. Newspaper articles, from reputable sources, will provide insight on current issues and reactions to U.S. operations and policy. The State Department website offers a variety of documents on the organization of country teams, expectations of a Chief of Mission and how the State Department is organized to accomplish strategic directives, providing an understanding of the current state of affairs within the Department.

### Analysis

Analysis will be accomplished on each of the secondary questions. Examining how the State Department is currently operating, the capabilities of the DoD and where they can be mutually supportive will help to draw conclusions on how different government agencies can better support the continued pursuit of VEOs. As conclusions are drawn, based on the qualitative data and analysis conducted, the overall conclusion

and recommendations will become more apparent. Analysis based on the conclusions of each secondary question will be used to draw the conclusion for the overall topic.

### Summary

There are several research methods available for this thesis, but the most relevant for this topic is the qualitative research technique. This technique is based more on study of the social environment, review of available literature and the subjective analysis of the data that is found. This is the most relevant for this topic since there is limited literature available on the primary issue so a thorough understanding of the secondary questions will lead to a comprehensive conclusion on the primary question.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

#### Cooperation between Department of Defense and State Department

What are the characteristics of current cooperation and integrated efforts between the DoD and State Department to conduct tracking and action against Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) and what are the various modes of host nation involvement and cooperation in such efforts?

As the United States continues to protect the homeland through operations and engagements overseas, close collaboration between the Departments of Defense and State Department remains crucial. A greater alignment of military capabilities and assets with diplomatic operations and timelines will require much information sharing will assist in the timeliness of operations, and should contribute to a better/smoothen application of military power. To understand where cooperation is needed the most, the current level of cooperation must be understood.

Prior to looking at the current level of cooperation, the ideal must be identified. As the world situation remains volatile, as the US continues drawing down forces overseas and as the goals and methods of global VEOs continue to be noxious, the US must be able to continue to protect US interests and personnel at home and abroad. Protection requires an understanding of enemy objectives, their means of employment, and good information on their location. Once such knowledge is in hand and diplomatic coordination is complete, targeting and action can be commenced. If the enemy is in transit or fleeing, the process must be executed rapidly by task-oriented, disciplined tactical and operational forces and without the need for much if any further coordination



with among bureaucracies. Success requires close cooperation between the DoD and State Department and such a relationship cannot simply be started once the enemy has been found; it must be done continuously and with the cooperation of the agencies of the host nation. A fleeing VEO must be rapidly neutralized, without excessive delay due to the diplomatic process or lack of information sharing.

According to several sources and authors, cooperation between US Government agencies and departments has been challenging, if not dysfunctional at times. For example, the inability to determine the proper chain of command from the policy makers down through the individuals responsible for executing operations and implementing plans has caused a backlog of effort and disjointed unity (Lamb and Marks 2011). Though there is a long history of unified effort between the DoD and State Department with the presence of military Foreign Area Officers and Military Attachés within embassies around the globe, there has been little focus on the tracking of VEOs or the timely application of military power against VEO targets (Mazzetti 2006).

The presence of Military personnel in embassies around the globe has been increasing, but the strain that it has had on the state department mission and ability to conduct diplomatic operations has often times caused distrust and lack of unity (Mazzetti 2006). The ability to track and target VEOs is something that is of great concern to military and diplomatic missions, but the ability to integrate efforts is not something that has been explored in great detail or with great enthusiasm.

The US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has voiced a desire to establish a global special operations network capable of closely coordinating with other nations Special Operations Forces (SOF) in order to more effectively influence potential

adversaries and destroy known enemies (Opall-Rome 2012). Such global integration would, at a minimum, seek to standardize SOF practices with allies. The DoD's ability to integrate will require close cooperation with a number of relevant US and foreign agencies and with diplomatic personnel to ensure a shared end state and unity of effort. The DoD is currently working to ensure that the Global Special Operations network will have the ability to accomplish goals within the policy objectives of the State Department (Opall-Rome 2012), but there is currently no plan to integrate the DoD capability to gather and analyze detailed intelligence on VEOs with Chief of Mission priorities or to ensure that the necessary diplomatic measures are in place if actionable intelligence is gathered.

General Ham, Commander of US Africa Command, in his address to the House Armed Services Committee on 29 February 2012, stated that the need for interagency cooperation is vital to the success of operations in Africa (Ham 2012). There are 14 of the world's weakest states in Africa alone, ripe for the transit, harbor, or establishment of VEO bases and operations (Foreign Policy 2012). He pointed out that the coordination between the DoD and State Department must improve to ensure a unity of effort in the defeat of terrorist organizations, establishment of credible, friendly military forces and the progression of economic security and stability.

With the attacks of 11 September 2012 against the US embassy and Ambassador in Libya as a backdrop, the need for cooperation between the DoD and the State Department cannot be highlighted better. If the DoD had been able to identify the pending threat earlier and had the Chief of Mission coordinated with the government of Libya for diplomatic clearances for a US operation, a huge tragedy might well have been

averted and an enemy defeated. To achieve an adequate level of cooperation-- with the DoD assisting the State Department in understanding the threats to US personnel and how transnational organizations in their area of influence can affect US interests at home and abroad -- requires unity of effort and command and close ties between the agencies.

Patrick Stewart said in his article “The US Response to Precarious States” that “The United States needs to rationalize and upgrade its fragmented approach to monitor precarious states and develop new mechanisms to improve the chance that early warning actually triggers early action” (Stewart 2007). This could not be truer. The ability to understand the threat that the US is facing is one part of the problem, the ability to coordinate diplomatically with our foreign partners is another aspect of the problem; but the critical capability is to conduct the entire cycle rapidly enough to allow the trigger to be pulled early enough to have an impact.

The level of cooperation that currently exists appears to be limited to reactive responses and within areas that have already been identified as being hostile. There is no denying that the DoD is integrated with the interagency community, specifically the State Department, into operations in areas of known enemy activity. Though important to the continued prosecution of targets in those areas, this integration does not help the US to conduct operations in areas outside of active conflict or against enemy targets that are in transit or have established temporary safe havens.

The reason for the lack of unity of effort and more complete partnership appears to be due to procedural disputes and a lack of overall guidance. “Because of the excessively rigid structures and processes of the current national security system, the White House is compelled to take charge of most strategy development and planning”

(Locher 2009). The institutional biases and procedures have caused much of the decision making and integration to be forced up the chain of command to the NSC and presidential level; a level that is not always capable of paying adequate attention to every location or every possible threat. The integration must be pushed as low as possible, with operational unity of effort ideally led by strong, competent Chiefs of Mission or appropriate regional Assistant Secretaries of State, and with strategic unity set by the Secretary of State, if under the ultimate authority of the President.

#### How are Embassies Currently Organized to Identify VEOs?

When exploring how the country teams are organized to target and coordinate operations against VEOs, an understanding of the primary missions of the country team and their basic organization must first be understood. The primary purpose of the country team is to maintain diplomatic relations with the host nation government and act as part of the Executive Branch of the US Government (Department of State 2009a).

The Chief of Mission, whether an Ambassador or Charge d'Affaires, directs the activities of the Country Team and is responsible for integrating the efforts of U.S Government agencies present in the embassy. His responsibilities include speaking for the U.S. Government on policy issues and concerns, directing and coordinating all U.S. executive branch officials (except those under the control of the regional Combatant Commander), security of the mission and all mission personnel, and to protect and serve Americans at home and abroad (Department of State 2009a).

President Obama specifically addressed his expectations to his Ambassadors in a letter and told them that his goal is to renew American security through operations and partnership and that an increased emphasis must be placed on the defeat of terrorism and

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This guidance is very directive and full of high expectations for the execution of his guidance (Obama 2009). The Chief of Mission is expected to be able to provide diplomatic relations with his host nation while also ensuring the defeat of terrorism through partnership, policy and actions. If the Chief of Mission is expected to be able to accomplish these tasks, he must be properly staffed, and more importantly, empowered to conduct all necessary operations and coordination with external agencies.

It is clear that the President has a desire for each Ambassador to conduct operations and diplomacy to further American ideals and policy while protecting American citizens. To see how this is possible and to what extent they currently have the capacity to accomplish this, the country team must be understood.

The country team is generally composed of the heads of each section shown in the diagram below, plus attaches or representatives from other Departments and agencies not shown. Those not shown may include DOD, USDA, Treasury, Energy, IRS, DOT, HAS, USDOC, and more. There is no specific mention in State Department education or the basic embassy organization that indicates an active desire or organization to track or target VEOs.




Figure 1. Organization of the Country Team

*Source:* Built by Author with information from Department of State (2010).

The typical missions for a basic country team are:

**Consular Affairs:** The support given to U.S. citizens and employees overseas that helps them if in trouble, in need of assistance during an emergency or in search of guidance for activities involving U.S. Citizenship. Consular Affairs can also support absentee voting and assist with their personal property, both home and abroad if needed (Department of State 2009a).

**Economic, Commercial and Financial Affairs:** Analyzes and reports on host nation economic and business conditions, trends and regulations. Assistance is given to U.S. businesses operating overseas. The section promotes U.S. exports and works to ensure host nation laws support fair commerce (Department of State 2009a).

**Political and Labor Issues:** The section analyzes and reports on political, social and labor trends in the host nation that can affect U.S. interests and security. It promotes

policies that are in the best interest of the U.S. and has the lead on negotiations with the host government (Department of State 2009a).

Regional Security Office (RSO): It looks after the day to day safety, security and protection of the personnel, files and physical assets of the embassy, consulates and other offices affiliated with the embassy. A U.S. Marine Corps guard element is often under the guidance of the RSO, though it may report directly to the Chief of Mission or his deputy (Department of State 2009a).

Defense Attaché (DATT): Defense Attaches and security assistance officers are the Chief of Mission's liaisons to DOD and key advisors on military and national security issues and operations. The DATT office is also able to support the host nation with foreign military sales and a variety of modes of cooperation (Department of State 2009a).

The Chief of Mission has a great amount of responsibility but there is no indication in the basic organizational chart, using unclassified and open source research, that there is a formal process or organization responsible for the tracking of VEOs or if there are any indications or warnings that VEOs may be in transit through the host nation or attempting to establish a base of operation or safe haven.

The organization of the basic country team for diplomatic engagement is significant and effective. The ability to synthesize intelligence on the location of VEOs or their objectives within the host nation to ensure diplomatic process and efforts help to defeat those VEOs must be more responsive to provide the country team accurate information as soon as it is available.

What diplomatic procedures are needed to  
coordinate targeting of VEOs?

Diplomatic procedures and engagements can range from low level interaction between personnel trying to solve common problems to the strategic level where heads of state interact to accomplish international objectives. All of these engagements and procedures can and will have an effect across the spectrum of operations and can affect how the U.S. is postured and prepared to provide security for its people and interests. Looking at the level of diplomatic procedures and involvement, specifically at the ability to coordinate and de-conflict military operations by U.S. forces in a time sensitive environment, all levels must be explored. The focus will be on the Chief of Mission and his ability to effect direct interaction with a host nation. The Chief of Mission will be able to provide a recommendation to the Assistant Secretary of State on the cost and benefit of a U.S. military operation and provide his analysis on whether the host nation will allow an operation and what their requirements are.

The Secretary of State, as the lead diplomat in the U.S. Government is responsible to carry on the mission of the State Department. The State Department is charged to “Shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just, and democratic world and foster conditions for stability and progress for the benefit of the American people and people everywhere” (Department of State 2011, 6). Within this mission is the inherent security that must be provided to the American people, at home and abroad. That security is provided through diplomacy and the promotion of democratic ideals while fostering partnership and stability across the globe. The policy and objectives that the Secretary of State develops and implements are directly related to the success of each Chief of



Mission in his localized diplomatic missions and interaction; the Secretary sets the stage and establishes limits on the execution of diplomacy.

The State Department has established specific strategic goals. The number one priority is to achieve peace and security by “preventing regional conflicts and transnational crime, combating terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction, and supporting homeland security, and security cooperation” (Department of State 2011, 19). With the focus of the State Department globally, not internally to the U.S. and the number one strategic goal being the promotion of security through the defeat of terrorism, the strategic framework and focus is clearly in place for successful localized diplomacy in support of U.S. counterterrorism goals and objectives.

At the more local level, the Chief of Mission directs diplomatic relations, as prescribed by the U.S. Government. There is no law that guarantees or even implies relations between nations; it simply exists through mutual agreement by the two nations (United Nations 1961a). There is also a requirement that each nation agrees to the exchange of personnel and the specific people that will be represented. The gaining nation must approve of the Chief of Mission (United Nations 1961b).

The strategic guidance and international laws that govern diplomacy help to set the stage for the personal interaction between the Chief of Mission, his staff and the host nation. The coordination and interaction at that level is what will cause success for the State Department in their accomplishment of their number one objective, to provide peace and security.

Helping to provide peace and security as the world progresses will vary by region, but the need to defeat terrorist networks through precision targeting and action will be

constant through all regions. The U.S. may not always be the best source of information and may not be able to provide the best forces to conduct specific operations but in the areas where U.S. forces are needed and the threat to American interests or personnel is strong enough to justify military actions, the diplomatic relations and coordination must be the strongest.

It is a violation of international law to conduct military operations in a sovereign country, even against a declared hostile enemy, without consent of that nation (United Nations 1945). Violating international law or disrupting future diplomatic relationships will not support U.S. strategic goals and must be avoided. The U.S. must be able to conduct operations against VEOs that are either transiting through or establishing safe havens within nations that we have positive diplomatic relations. There cannot be a long diplomatic process to gain the approval and support of the host nation to conduct operations, it must be discussed and coordinated before the establishment of the need or the opportunity may pass and the security of the American people and interests may not be assured. This diplomatic coordination must happen before the need arises.

There are some examples of the U.S. conducting operations against terrorist objectives in countries where there was no prior coordination and the results were mixed with regards to host nation response and relations. The most well known example is the May 2011 raid conducted by U.S. SOF that killed Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden; conducted against a known location within Pakistan without the consent or knowledge of the Pakistani Government (Ware 2011). General Ashfaq Kayani, the head of the Pakistani Army, said immediately after the raid that “any similar action violating the sovereignty of Pakistan will warrant a review on the level of military/intelligence cooperation with the

United States” (Perlez 2011). The operation, though hugely successful, had immediate strategic consequences that the President and Secretary of State had to deal with. The Pakistani Government also made it clear that the U.S. had conducted an “unauthorized unilateral action” (Rohde 2011). The strategic implications for the operation were significant, but the results and success of the mission justified it in the eyes of international scrutiny.

By pursuing Osama Bin Laden internationally, the U.S. was protecting American lives and interests and there is little criticism available to say that the mission was not justified, even without the consent of the Pakistani Government. This may not always be true, as the U.S. attempts to continue to attack VEOs, and has a desire to target individuals and networks not as well known as Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. The Pakistani Government, in theory, had its hands tied with taking a strong stand against the U.S. raid since the target was known globally and he was residing within their sovereign borders. Other targets, in other countries will not be as well known.

That is why the need for positive, integrated and early diplomatic relations and coordination will be the key to future success as the U.S. tries to continue targeting VEOs globally. The footprint of U.S. forces is decreasing overseas (White House 2012), and the ability for U.S. forces to effectively target those regions will undoubtedly decrease along with it.

In regions where VEO presence is known or suspected or there is a valid assessment that there will be trafficking of VEOs through a nation, the chief of Mission needs to be aware of the information and must begin coordination with the host nation. The intelligence community will be able to identify areas where VEOs are most likely to

operate, template routes and regions, and provide a common understanding where they may want to operate in the future. They will likely not be able to provide specific locations and timelines for their movement and operations. Armed with the information of future probability and knowing the guidance from the Secretary of State and President, a Chief of Mission must be able to start the diplomatic approval process for U.S. military operations. This process, though time consuming, is essential to the ultimate success of a future operation and legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

Once the intelligence community identifies a general region, they will begin to track and locate the specific VEO assets, safe havens and routes. This can be done with the support of the DoD and the capacity they can provide. This general region should be the focus for the diplomatic negotiations (the region being a specific country or area containing multiple countries). The specific intelligence leading to a desire to conduct a U.S. lead military operation may never be found, the opportunity to attack a VEO may never be determined or the threat to U.S. personnel or interests may never be high enough to warrant an operation by U.S. military assets. In that case the diplomatic agreements and coordination may not have been valuable to the success of the mission. On the other hand, it would be catastrophic if the diplomatic process took too long to allow for legal application of U.S. military forces if there is precise enough information on a VEO location and the threat to U.S. interests is high enough. The only way to ensure that the process is rapid and responsive is to coordinate ahead of time, establish a baseline agreement and only act on it when absolutely needed.

Are there arrangements that allow for the rapid engagement  
of VEO targets?

In looking for answers on whether the U.S. can effectively conduct pre-emptive diplomacy to allow for the rapid execution of military operations against time sensitive VEO targets, the relationships that are currently working and the amount of emphasis that has been and will continue to be placed on this form of diplomacy must be understood. Studying an area where the U.S. has conducted operations in the past, as part of a partnership with the host nation or as a unilateral force, will help to understand what is possible and what has not yet been explored.

The first places to look at are areas where there are internationally focused VEOs and the U.S. is conducting partnered operations and advisory operations with the host nation to defeat the VEO influence beyond their borders. Two of the most recent and effective examples are those of Colombia and the Horn of Africa (HOA).

In Colombia, the U.S. began helping the fight against drug manufactures with specific emphasis on the insurgents and violent organizations responsible for their cultivation, distribution and marketing (White House 2000). The U.S. stance was to help them defeat the organizations by providing training for Colombia's counter-narcotic teams as well as providing them with some advanced equipment including radar, aircraft capable of inserting and extracting forces and providing intelligence collection (White House 2000). This assistance was vital to the success of the counter drug operations but the greatest impact was seen by providing the necessary forces capable of attacking and destroying or disrupting the VEOs operating freely in Colombia. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) had been operating in Colombia for years, spilling

their violence over into Ecuador and Brazil (Johnson 2001), a clear disruption to the regional security and probable threat to U.S. interests in the area.

With the commitment of financial resources, diplomatic assistance and military personnel and equipment starting in early 2000, the U.S. began its long and slow campaign to help defeat the Colombian VEOs before they had the ability to threaten Americans or American interests. The results have been positive for the eradication of some narcotics, but the overall success has been in the diplomatic leadership provided for the ‘whole-of-government’ approach to dealing with the problems seen in Colombia (Department of State 2012). The Colombian military capacity has grown and developed to the point that it is capable of defeating much of the threat that they face, while protecting the interests that the U.S. has in the region. Based on the diplomatic relations that were established, the U.S. was never required to conduct any major offensive military operations in the region to protect national interests.

The Horn of Africa is a region of great instability (Foreign Policy 2012) and actual VEO operational and transit safe havens. This region has been the focus of the U.S. Government and military as there have been indications of Al Qaeda presence and the potential for transnational threats originating from these areas. The primary threat in that region is Al Shabaab, a terrorist organization with close ties to Al Qaeda (Quigley 2011). This organization has been able to thrive due to the lack of a powerful government in places like Somalia and gain influence, safe haven and political power through intimidation and violence. There are also indications that this faction of Al Qaeda has desires to attack U.S. people and interests, at home and abroad (Jacobson, Nisman, and Radzinski, 2012). The ability of U.S. forces to target this organization, while

simultaneously coordinating with the local governments has pushed U.S. diplomacy and military action to the limits.

The desire in Eastern Africa is not, and will not be to establish a U.S. military presence or permanent bases. It is simply to attack and destroy VEOs that have the means and desire to attack U.S. people and interests. In this particular case, the U.S. interests are with the stability of the region and promotion of democratic values while preventing the spread of violent influence and actions (Ham 2012).

The U.S. has been conducting operations continuously since 2002 in the Horn of Africa (Naylor 2011). The basis for the targets was the interrogation of prisoners captured in Afghanistan during the initial months of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) as the entirety of the Al Qaeda network was outlined and more understanding was gained. These operations have not come without risk or reservation by some of the Ambassadors and diplomatic agencies, as the risk was evaluated against the reward. In 2003, against the desires of the Ambassador to Somalia, the U.S. military conducted surveillance operations along the coast to establish observation points for the development of intelligence on Al Qaeda (Naylor 2011).

More recently, the U.S. has conducted multiple direct action strikes that have destroyed much of the senior leadership of Al Shabaab, closely coordinated and diplomatically approved by the host nations and country teams operating in the HOA. These operations have been effective due to the close coordination and pre-emptive agreements established over the term of many years. This model has been effective, but it has not been quick. The requirement for the future, as the threats are continuously pushed around, will be to have agreements in place with nations that may not have any VEOs

currently operating within their borders; agreements that allow for decisive U.S. action immediately upon realization that a threat has emerged and a VEO has begun transit or started to establish a safe haven.

These agreements allow for U.S. military action as needed, within the constraints of the diplomatic process. They are long-term and facilitate continued action by U.S. forces that allows for the continued security for U.S. people and interests. These agreements are not established in a time constrained manner or under the premise of a fleeing target. Though the process and coordination is what is needed, there must be a way to conduct it as pre-emptive diplomacy, to allow targeting as VEOs spread their roots globally.

These agreements have been between the U.S. diplomats operating in Eastern Africa and the national leadership of those nations. The agreements that have been established have involved the trade of intelligence, monetary supplements (either through direct payment, trade agreements or economic stimulus packages) and the establishment of a lasting military partnership. One of the more effective methods has been to build a military partnership with the host nation, where there is a long term mutual goal that is being worked towards. By allowing the U.S. Military to conduct training with a foreign nation, the U.S. is able to build confidence in the host nation military while developing situational awareness of the environment. This supports the development of a competent military force for the host nation (one of their objectives) while building a positive relationship with their political establishment (a U.S. strategic objective) and allowing DoD forces to build environmental awareness and understanding (a military objective before any operation).



Does the DoD possess the capability to  
rapidly prosecute targets if needed?

The U.S. military has conventional and Special Operations Forces (SOF) that have the ability to conduct direct action raids, with a high degree of precision and effectiveness, with little or no notice. For the purpose of this research, the primary forces analyzed are SOF elements, with some background information on the capability and posture of U.S. conventional forces.

In looking at the conventional military, both the Army and Marine Corps will be analyzed and the starting point will be with the posture of the Army in 2013 and beyond. There is a reduction in troops scheduled over the course of the next three years, with numbers falling back to where they were prior to the commencement of the GWOT with the end of the temporary end strength increase (Department of the Army 2012). This drawdown will reduce the number of available personnel for employment by the Army and it will force the operational forces to fall back into a cyclical training and readiness posture, with some designated forces available for immediate employment, while others will require time and resources to gain the necessary proficiency to be combat effective.

Under the new guidance, there will be urgent, essential and important forces. The urgent forces will be the ones most capable of rapidly responding to global threats. These forces will be manned and equipped to a level that allows them to be immediately deployed. Under the new guidance, the 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps and the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division will be the Global Response Forces (GRF), capable of immediate deployment in support of any Combatant Commander, to include response to terrorist threats or emerging opportunities (Department of the Army 2012, Annex A).

The posturing of a GRF in the U.S. will allow for the flexibility to react in a rapid manner, along with the joint partners required to move and sustain the force, across the globe in response to Chief of Mission or intelligence requirements to target VEOs. There are also Army forces that have been allocated to separate COCOMs, available to respond rapidly from their forward positions in support to emerging threats and opportunities. The 173<sup>rd</sup> Airborne Brigade in Vicenza, Italy is allocated to U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and is available for immediate response and action across Europe and in Africa in support of AFRICOM.

These conventional Army forces are capable of conducting rapid deployment and integration into an area of operation to strike VEO objectives globally, to ensure continued pressure and disruption of terrorist networks. The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) also possesses a rapid strike capability with conventional forces postured globally as part of each Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). There are currently seven MEUs located globally, with three forward positioned (Department of the Navy 1998). These three MEUs are located in the Mediterranean Sea, Western Pacific and Indian Ocean / Persian Gulf (Department of the Navy 1998, 76). These forces are always available to rapidly respond to emerging threats or opportunities.

Each of the MEUs is augmented with Navy or USMC SOF elements that can conduct special reconnaissance, direct action raids and in-extremis hostage rescue (Department of the Navy 1998). These core competencies provide immediate forces available to conduct operations in support of VEO destruction at the discretion of a Chief of Mission or COCOM.

The evidence that conventional military formations are available globally to respond to emerging or opportunistic targets is convincing, but often times the desire for a SOF element to conduct the operation will be much greater due to the complexity of the operation, politically sensitive nature of the target or location and threat that the enemy poses to U.S. forces. In these circumstances, there would be several different SOF elements available and capable of executing the mission.

The characteristics of a SOF operation include: detailed intelligence, knowledge of the human and physical terrain, rigorous training and rehearsals, extreme distance from the support base or adjacent unit, sophisticated communications systems, discriminate and precise application of force, and sophisticated means of insertion and extraction (Joint Special Operations University 2011). These characteristics of SOF operations are exactly what would be expected in politically sensitive environments, where diplomatic relations are solid and there is no room for error.

Understanding the characteristics of SOF operations is important to understanding that there is a capacity available to conduct operations, but specific forces have different core competencies and are available in different ways and along different timelines. The first organization to study is the U.S. Army Special Forces (SF).

Special Forces is organized into 12 man teams, capable of integrating into a DoD or State Department leadership structure with the capacity to conduct foreign internal defense (FID), unconventional warfare (UW), direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR) and counter terrorism (CT). These teams typically distribute across an area of operations to ensure maximum ability to influence the population and friendly force partners, while simultaneously gathering intelligence and developing the overall enemy

and friendly picture for their higher command. Conducting DA operations is a secondary mission for most SF teams and they are not as available for employment in that role, with the exception of the Commander's In extremis Force (CIF), which is a combination of multiple SF teams that is capable of conducting limited DA missions when other SOF is not available (Department of the Army 2010b).

SF is an option for employment against VEO targets but they are not the best trained or postured for that specific type of operation.

The Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Command provides forces that are trained and capable of similar missions to SF. Navy SEALs are organized into platoons of 17 men, each platoon capable of conducting the same missions as an SF team, with a different focus for their training and evaluation and a greater capability to conduct operations from the sea or along inland rivers. SEAL platoons are capable of DA, SR, CT, FID and UW but their focus for employment is weighted on DA, SR and CT. SEAL platoons are often deployed as part of USMC MEUs to provide the ability to conduct special operations from forward positioned locations, utilizing SOF specific assets as well as the assets available to the MEU with their organic capability (Joint Special Operations University 2011).

SEALs are also deployable and recoverable from submerged vessels to minimize their signature and footprint. They have the ability to launch, undetected, and move ashore to conduct operations against VEO targets while maintaining the smallest U.S. signature possible. They can then extract the same way, leaving little to no evidence of U.S. involvement (Joint Special Operations University 2011). In 2002, Navy SEALs conducted clandestine reconnaissance operations along the coast of Somalia by deploying

and recovering through submerged vessels, without being detected (Naylor 2011). These missions were designed to provide intelligence on Al Qaeda activity along the Somalia coast, but a similar operation could be conducted with a force designed for DA, with similar results. The capacity for Navy SEALs to conduct VEO strikes in support of Chief of Mission desires and requirements is very high. They have the deployment methods, skills and readiness available to support the requirement.

The final organization that must be understood is the U.S. Army's 75<sup>th</sup> Ranger Regiment. The Ranger Regiment is the force that is most rapidly deployable, trained exclusively in direct action and able to conduct missions through land, sea or air. The Regiment has forces, with allocated aircraft for movement, available for immediate reaction from the U.S. and maintains a capability for movement to a staging location on land or at sea. These forces are capable of conducting forcible entry operations, against a known enemy location or conduct low signature direct action operations against politically sensitive targets (Department of the Army 2010b).

The Ranger Regiment maintains a level of proficiency that allows it to be precise and measured against a VEO target that can range in size from small to large, with raid proficiency on platoon, company, battalion and regimental sized objectives. This flexibility and precision, with low or high visibility options for employment makes the Ranger Regiment a very formidable and available force for the global pursuit of VEOs and their networks.

#### What capacity can the DoD provide to support the State Department?

The DoD has developed an increased capability to conduct intelligence collection and fusion since the onset of the GWOT and has refined the practices and procedures

needed to be effective. These practices are widely employed by conventional and special operations elements deployed to Afghanistan and were previously employed while fighting in Iraq. The synthesis of all sources of intelligence to paint a clearer picture for the decision makers to see has proven to be vital in the success of precision operations. To understand what each aspect of intelligence is and how the military uses it, each type of intelligence must be understood.

Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT): intelligence that is gathered by employing aerial assets, like satellite or aircraft. It is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and information to visually depict physical features and activities on the Earth (Joint Forces Command 2007). This form of intelligence is useful in gathering pictures of enemy locations, tracking enemy movement or identifying their bases, weapons, equipment, support nodes and command centers. GEOINT helps to refine locations for enemy locations that may have been determined using another form of intelligence. GEOINT also helps to confirm the presence of civilians, obstacles or any other form of atmospheric data that is useful to the decision makers about the area around the objective (Department of the Army 2010a).

GEOINT analysis and collection will be vital for the Chief of Mission to understand and visualize if a VEO is beginning to establish a support network or if he is transiting the host nation; information that is vital to his ability to conduct rapid diplomatic negotiation for the use of U.S. military force.

Signals Intelligence (SIGNIT): “produced by exploiting foreign communications systems and non communications emitters. SIGINT provides unique intelligence and analysis information in a timely manner. The discipline comprises communications

intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence” (Department of the Army 2010a, 1-23). SIGNIT, when properly employed and if provided to the necessary leadership in a timely manner can provide for the rapid understanding of an evolving enemy situation.

SIGINT, to include TECHINT, will help the Chief of Mission understand pending or changing situations, allowing him to make decisions or prepare diplomacy for future operations. By painting the complete picture for him, he will be better able to apply all aspects of government power to accomplish his diplomatic goals.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT): “the collection of foreign information by a trained HUMINT collector. It uses human sources and a variety of collection methods, both passively and actively, to collect information including multimedia on threat characteristics” (Department of the Army 2010a, 1-22). HUMINT helps provide atmospherics and can be done in a passive manner that is non intrusive to the host nation but allows for the Chief of Mission to maintain awareness of the situation around him and across the country.

HUMINT is most effective when used as part of an integrated intelligence collection network and is very effective at establishing a starting point for operations and the introduction of other forms of intelligence.

The DoD clearly has the ability and capacity to collect and analyze each type of relevant intelligence, provide a product that is easy to understand and allow key leaders and decision makers to visualize their area so they can make decisions. This is very applicable to a Chief of Mission if he was empowered and enabled to conduct proactive diplomacy in support of the continued pursuit of the GWOT. The personnel within the

DoD are capable of providing the analysis and synthesis of the information that is collected, as long as they are able to focus on a specific region and the collection assets are properly tasked to support their priorities. This introduces the requirement to allocate collection assets to a Chief of Mission priority when there is an evolving or perceived threat.

As the conflict in Afghanistan continues to draw down, there will be a need for future collection that will not be focused entirely in areas of declared conflict. As threats are seen moving or rising, a Chief of Mission must be empowered to request collection support from the DoD, CIA, NSA or DIA so that there can be focused collection in his host nation, in accordance with his diplomatic requirements for proactive coordination. By giving him the necessary tools and information to make effective decisions, he will be better postured to coordinate U.S. military action before the need arises; allowing for a more effective and timely application of power against VEOs.

#### Chapter 4 Summary

The State Department, CIA, NSA, etc. and DoD do not currently conduct integrated VEO tracking or targeting. There is a divide between the military and diplomatic agencies that can cause slowed response and prevent rapid execution of military targets if required. The Country Team, under the direction of the Chief of Mission is often times under staffed and over tasked with their current requirements. They do not have the ability to take on more tasks related to intelligence synthesis or understanding of VEO movement or operations. There are some examples of the DoD and State Department cooperating closely with the focus on the defeat of terrorism and insurgency, but it appears to be reactive and slow to develop. There is a need to establish



closer integration to allow for proactive diplomacy, allowing for agreements to be made before the need for U.S. military action arises; allowing for the rapid application of U.S. military power to defeat or destroy VEOs that aim to attack U.S. people or interests. The DoD has the intellectual capacity and capability to provide analysts that can synthesis all forms of intelligence and there will be an increased availability for collection assets once the drawdown in Afghanistan is complete.

The assets and personnel are available and there is a clear need for increased cooperation between the agencies to support the continued attack of VEOs who wish to do America harm.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

This study has analyzed the coordination between the DoD and State Department in regards to tracking and targeting VEOs across the globe. It has looked at the current level of cooperation, organization of the State Department and it's country teams, diplomatic procedures required to conduct offensive operations to defeat VEOs, current arrangements that exist for targeting VEOs, the DoD's capability to conduct time sensitive targeting and the support capacity that the DoD currently has that would be beneficial to augment the State Department to effectively track VEOs.

This is an important and relevant topic as the U.S. military draws forces down from the Middle East, causing a decrease in the ability to track and attack terrorist organizations in that region. The influence and global ambitions of VEOs may well continue to expand, requiring an even more aggressive and responsive posture for U.S. agencies and departments. This is what is currently lacking in the organization and actions of the U.S. Government and the agencies that are charged with conducting foreign diplomacy and military action.

The DoD and State Department do not currently cooperate or integrate effectively enough to track and target VEOs. There is no evidence to show that there is a habitual relationship, training or even a common purpose in regards to destroying VEOs globally. The State Department has, as one of its primary functions, the task to defeat terrorism abroad; but there is no integration with the DoD that would indicate there is any ability to strike targets or conduct offensive operations in a time constrained manner. This lack of

cooperation can and will be detrimental to the ability of the U.S. Government to strike VEOs when there is clear evidence of a threat to U.S. personnel and interests.

The primary element responsible to conduct operations in a foreign country is the country team which is not staffed or tasked to conduct intelligence analysis. This could lead to a delay in the understanding of timely intelligence that has been collected or hinder the ability of the country team to conduct the most effective diplomacy possible. This lack of organic analysis must be resolved.

The U.S. Government has conducted several diplomatic missions where the introduction of U.S. military forces went smoothly and the goals of the U.S. were accomplished in a timely and accurate manner. This process took several years and wasn't without delays and compromise. This is the State Department's responsibility and it must be conducted within a shorter timeframe. If the opportunity to attack a VEO that has the will and ability to attack American people arises, it must not be passed up or delayed due to an extended diplomatic process or negotiation. It must be attacked immediately.

The DoD has a great capability to conduct strike operations against VEO targets, with little to no notice. There are adequate conventional military forces, from both the Army and Marine Corps, that are globally positioned and within the United States to conduct any sized operation required. There is a significant SOF capability to do the same, with no notice deployment ability and extremely high precision. These forces are available any time and can go anywhere.

The DoD has refined techniques and increased proficiency in conducting all source analysis and tracking individuals and organizations since 2001. This capability is

used extensively in Afghanistan but the requirement for those specially trained analysts will decrease as the U.S. continues to draw forces down from the Middle East. There will also be an increase in available intelligence collection assets and systems as the U.S. forces draw down. This decrease in requirements will make those same analysts and equipment available for tasking or assignment to other locations in support of similar targeting. This type of asset employment can be used for integration into the State Department structure, under the control of a country team.

The State Department and DoD do not coordinate enough and the State Department is not manned adequately to support the fusion of information to facilitate the tracking and striking of VEO targets. There is adequate intelligence personnel and equipment available within the DoD to augment the State Department, allowing the current State Department staff to focus on proactive diplomacy in support of potential U.S. Military operations in the future.

### Recommendations

The DoD must provide intelligence personnel and collection capabilities to State Department country teams to analyze available intelligence to track VEOs. These personnel must be able to conduct analysis and fuse all intelligence disciplines in order to develop a clear picture of the movement and predict future actions of VEOs operating within the area of responsibility of the respective Chief of Mission.

The DoD must provide intelligence collection assets to help with the tracking of the VEOs, under the guidance and direction of the intelligence support team that will be assigned to the geographic region. These assets will become more available as more U.S. military forces withdraw from Afghanistan.

Once a country team has an intelligence support team from the DoD, they will be able to develop and predict the intelligence situation in their area of responsibility. With this information, the Chief of Mission must prioritize the requirements for proactive diplomacy; he must establish standing agreements with the host nation to allow future U.S. military operations if required. If he waits until a valid and urgent VEO target is identified, there may not be enough time to wait for diplomatic authority to strike the target before it moves or is able to attack American people or interests. This process must be done proactively.

With the integration of an intelligence support team into the country team, the authority of the Chief of Mission must be expanded. The analysis will be conducted by military personnel but they must be organized under the Chief of Mission. He must be able to task and employ those personnel as he sees fit. This will ensure complete unity of effort, in line with the State Department requirements as the executive agency for foreign relations.

The exact organization of the intelligence support team will be determined based on the threat and VEO activity for the specific country team. They could be as small as a single person capable of conducting all source analysis or as big as a team with multiple specialized analysts for each type of intelligence.

This integration of DoD personnel into country teams should occur as more forces withdraw from Afghanistan. As this happens, there will be a growing pool of available personnel to fill these billets; there is no need to increase the numbers within the military or change the training for personnel.

The intelligence support team should be assigned to the DATT within each country team. The DATT can provide the best oversight and collaboration with the Chief of Mission and has the physical infrastructure and organizational influence to support the intelligence requirements of the staff.

The collaboration between the DoD and State Department will not solely allow for the effective identification, tracking and targeting of VEOs. The more important coordination that must occur is between the U.S. diplomatic mission and the host nation government. This coordination is the most difficult step in the process and requires the most amount of time. The DoD has proven that it is effective at tracking and destroying VEOs and there is a desire to be able to integrate across agency boundaries to conduct these operations globally. The challenge increases when host nation integration is required and diplomatic processes are stressed. Even if there is seamless coordination between the DoD and State Department, the requirement for host nation support and diplomatic approval is real and that support is not something that can be established by U.S. agencies alone; there is an innate reliance on the host nation.

#### Recommendations for Further Research

This study has revealed many areas that should be investigated further, some of them being within the classified realm, to help understand the problem more fully and how it can be truly solved.

1. What should the organization, equipment and manning cycle be for an intelligence support team? This research will help find a more precise answer for the actual people required, the facilities needed to support them and how the DoD could fill these billets as a priority for future operations.

2. What is the willingness of State Department officials to assume a greater responsibility for tracking VEOs and coordinating U.S. military actions? Does the State Department have a desire and do their officials have the ability to synchronize the efforts of multiple agencies to continue the effective tracking of VEOs? If not, how should the information be passed to the country teams to develop their understanding of the situation and increased ability to conduct effective proactive diplomacy?

3. What is the current understanding for future VEO movement and desires? This is something that is always being studied and templated by the intelligence community, but research should be done on how it relates to diplomacy. If there is accurate enough templates for future actions by VEOs, the diplomatic process can begin immediately to coordinate future military action in those areas. This will also allow for a refinement of the intelligence support team allocation and positioning; with some country teams receiving a large allocation of personnel and equipment while others may receive very little or none.

4. Integration of all agencies and departments from the U.S. Government is essential for successful identification, tracking and destruction of VEOs and will include the DoD, State Department, CIA and NSA. Further study must be done on the coordination of the CIA and NSA into the intelligence support teams and what capability they can directly provide to the Chief of Mission.

5. How can the U.S. coordinate better with a host nation to conduct military operations within their borders to destroy VEOs? What is the process that is required and what tools are available to the diplomatic mission to encourage cooperation? What organizations and agencies does the State Department have to coordinate with and who

generally provides approval from the host nation? This topic was addressed in this thesis, but it must be understood more fully to be beneficial for future operations. There is a need for better DoD and State Department coordination to track and destroy VEOs but there is a greater need for an understanding of the need for U.S. and host nation coordination to gain approval for the operations.

6. This topic should be researched using classified information and systems. It will enable a greater degree of understanding of the current intelligence analysis and capability of each country team and allow for a more specific direction for the employment of a DoD intelligence support team.



## GLOSSARY

**Collaboration.** Any joint activity by two or more organizations that is intended to produce more public value than could be produced when the organizations act alone (Government Accounting Office 2005).

**Interagency Coordination.** Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense and engaged U.S. Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective (Joint Staff 2008).

**Whole of Government Approach.** An approach that integrates all agencies and efforts within the U.S. Government to achieve unity of effort (Joint Staff 2008).

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